Manila
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 254976, August 20, 2024 ]
MARCELINO DELA CRUZ LINGGANAY, PETITIONER, VS. DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS COMPANY, INC. AND NARCISO MORALES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
INTING, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 155756. The CA affirmed the Decision4 and the Resolution5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 11-003517-17 (NLRC NCR-06-09385-17) which agreed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) that Del Monte Land Transport Bus Company, Inc. (DLTB Co.) and Narciso Morales (collectively, respondents) validly dismissed Marcelino Dela Cruz Lingganay (Lingganay) from employment. Moreover, the CA agreed with the LA in denying his motion to further amend6 his Amended Complaint.7
The Antecedents
The case stemmed from the amended complaint for illegal dismissal which Lingganay filed against respondents on July 13, 2017. In the amended complaint, Lingganay alleged that respondents illegally terminated his employment and claimed for payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.8
On August 17, 2017, Lingganay filed his Position Paper With Urgent Motion to Amend9 his amended complaint (motion to further amend), wherein he prayed for the following additional awards: separation pay, holiday premium, rest day pay, and underpaid wages.
Lingganay alleged that (1) respondents initially hired him as a bus driver with a daily salary of PHP 337.00; (2) on October 21, 2013, while driving the company bus along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Concepcion, Plaridel, Province of Quezon, he figured in an accident involving one Isidro Alvarez; (3) eventually, respondents settled the matter with Isidro Alvarez; (4) on December 7, 2013, his employment contract with respondents ended, but he continued to work as a "yardman" with a daily wage of PHP 300.00; (5) on December 10, 2013, respondents rehired him as a bus driver; (6) sometime in 2014, respondents assigned him at the motor pool division of the company in Cubao, Quezon City; (7) subsequently, on July 15, 2015, respondents transferred him to the Lucena Line of DLTB Co.;10 (8) on November 5, 2015, respondents suspended him for five days for failure to "take time schedule" on October 8, 2015; (9) on January 21, 2017, respondents again suspended him for 10 days for being involved in an accident with a motorcycle on December 30, 2016; (10) he resumed his duties on January 31, 2017, but "with warning" from respondents; (11) on May 1, 2017, while driving the company bus along the San Juanico Bridge, Samar, he again figured in an accident as he crashed into the rear portion of a Toyota Wigo; (12) consequently, respondents issued a Memorandum11 dated May 5, 2017, giving him five days to explain his side and placing him under preventive suspension; (13) on May 22, 2017, he submitted a handwritten Salaysay and attended the administrative hearing/investigation of the case.12
In the Decision13 dated May 29, 2017, respondents terminated Lingganay from employment for transgressing the company rules and regulations on health and safety, i.e., "Violation 8.1.4 — Any form of laxity, reckless driving and gross negligence resulting to damages to property, injuries, death[,] and other casualties."14 This prompted Lingganay to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents. In his complaint, Lingganay argued as follows:
It was not his fault that a van suddenly overtook the Toyota Wigo which was in front of the bus he was then driving. Regardless of the driving distance between the two vehicles, the descending condition of the road made it difficult for the bus driven by the Complainant not to hit the Toyota Wigo which made a sudden and unexpected stop to avoid hitting the van that overtook it.
At any rate, the negligence – even if true – must be gross and habitual ... These [characteristics were] wanting in the present case.
....
[W]hile the Complainant had been involved in other accidents before, these accidents were only minor ones. There was also no finding by the Respondent Company that the Complainant was negligent and/or that he was the cause of these accidents. Notably, the Respondents even allowed the Complainant to report back to work after these accidents.15
For their part, respondents averred that they hired Lingganay as a bus driver on December 10, 2013, but they dismissed him on May 29, 2017, for habitually transgressing the company rules and regulations on health and safety. They recounted that on December 30, 2016, the bus driven by Lingganay bumped a motorcycle at Barangay Tabason, Tagkawayan, Quezon, causing physical injuries to the motorcycle driver and his back rider. Likewise, respondents narrated that on May 1, 2017, Lingganay, while driving the company bus along the San Juanico Bridge, Samar, figured in another accident when he crashed into the rear portion of a Toyota Wigo.16 According to respondents, the recklessness of Lingganay caused damage to the company bus amounting to PHP 6,500.00 and to the Toyota Wigo in the amount of PHP 99,000.00;17 and to avoid any legal suit against the company, they were compelled to settle the full amount of PHP 99,000.00 with the car owner.18 Respondents argued that as Lingganay habitually drove the company bus recklessly, his dismissal from work was justified for violating the company rules and regulations on health and safety.
The Ruling of the LA
In the Decision19 dated September 29, 2017, the LA ruled in favor of respondents and found that Lingganay's dismissal from work was justified as he transgressed the company rules and regulations on health and safety. The dispositive portion of the LA's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
So ordered.20
Moreover, the LA denied Lingganay's motion to further amend his complaint pursuant to Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure (2011 NLRC Rules), which states in part that "an amended complaint or petition may be filed before the Labor Arbiter at any time before the filing of position paper[.]"21
Aggrieved, Lingganay appealed to the NLRC.
The Ruling of the NLRC
In the Decision22 dated December 27, 2017, the NLRC agreed with the LA that Lingganay was validly dismissed from employment. However, it did not rule on the issue of whether the LA properly denied Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint. The NLRC ratiocinated:
...[I]t is beyond doubt that [Lingganay] was guilty of gross negligence and violation of the Company Rules and Regulations on Health and Safety Rules.
[Lingganay's] behaviour in his driving exposed his employer to financial liability for the damage and injuries he caused to third parties. He became a peril on the roads, streets[,] and highways, endangering the lives, properties[,] and safety of pedestrians and riding public. His acts became inimical to the interest of his employer. He should not have expected his employer to retain him any further in his employment after the former was forced to pay the amount of [PHP] 99,000.00 in settlement of the claim of Ma. Angelica Talbo, owner of the Toyota Wigo.
In his attempt to justify his infractions, complainant argues that his negligence was not gross and habitual.
[Lingganay] is mistaken. Negligence does not necessarily require habituality to be a valid cause for dismissal. The negligence of [Lingganay] in the case at bar was gross negligence.
....
The dismissal of [Lingganay] was also justified under the totality of infractions rule because he was a repeat offender.23
The dispositive portion of the NLRC's Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 29, 2017 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.24
Lingganay moved for a reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion in its Resolution dated February 27, 2018.25
The Ruling of the CA
In the Decision26 dated July 6, 2020, the CA agreed with the LA in denying Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint, holding that pursuant to Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, "the amendment must be done before the filing of the parties' position paper."27 Moreover, the CA explained that Rule V, Section 12 thereof prohibits the amendment of the complaint after the filing of the position papers unless there is leave from the LA. According to the CA, given that "the [a]mended Complaint was embedded in [Lingganay's] Position Paper, ... the Labor Arbiter correctly denied [his] motion to amend complaint."28
Further, the CA agreed with the labor tribunals that Lingganay was validly dismissed from employment as his "repeated involvement in several vehicular mishaps constitute[d] a violation of Section 8.1.4 of the Health and Safety Rules." According to the CA, "[s]uch mishap . . . indicated that [Lingganay] was driving recklessly fast as [shown] by the damage it caused to the Toyota Wigo which amounted to [PHP] 99,000.00."29 Moreover, the CA held that Lingganay's termination was based on Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code which states, among others, that an employer may terminate the employment of an employee for his/her gross and habitual neglect of duties.30 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.31
Aggrieved, Lingganay moved for a reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution32 dated December 9, 2020.
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
The issue to be resolved in the case is whether the CA committed a reversible error (1) in denying Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint pursuant to Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules; and (2) in holding that his dismissal from employment was valid.
Arguments of Lingganay
Lingganay argues that the CA erred in agreeing with the LA that his motion to further amend his amended complaint violated Rule V, Sections 11 and 12 of the 2011 NLRC Rules. He avers that the incorporation of his motion to amend and his second amended complaint in the position paper was actually sanctioned by the Court's ruling in the case of Our Haus Realty Development Corp. v. Parian,33 which pronounced that a claim which was not raised in the pro forma complaint before the LA may still be raised in the position paper.34
Likewise, Lingganay contends that he was illegally dismissed from work in the absence of just or authorized cause to terminate his employment.35 He points out that even if he was indeed negligent in the performance of his tasks, it was not shown that his negligence was "both gross and habitual."36 Thus, the penalty of dismissal meted out on him by respondents was too harsh.37
Arguments of Respondents
For their part, respondents aver that the CA correctly agreed with the LA in denying Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint as it violated Rule V, Sections 11 and 12 of the 2011 NLRC Rules which require a complainant to already include his/her causes of action in the complaint and to amend his/her complaint prior to the filing of the position paper.38
Respondents added that the CA did not err in affirming the findings of the labor tribunals that Lingganay was validly dismissed from work because (1) he violated the rules and regulations of the company on health and safety and (2) his transgression constituted "[g]ross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties" under Article 297(b) of the Labor Code.
The Ruling of the Court
"It is an established rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The basic principle is set forth in the rule itself."39 The question as to whether Lingganay violated Rule V, Sections 11 and 12 of the 2011 NLRC Rules in incorporating his motion to amend and his second amended complaint in his position paper is a question of law; thus, it is a proper subject of the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Equally important is the rule that in a Rule 45 review in labor cases, the Court examines the CA's Decision from the prism of whether [in a petition for certiorari,] the latter had correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's Decision, i.e., in affirming the LA's denial of Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint.40
In San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union (SACORU) v. CocaCola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI),41 the Court explained the concept of grave abuse of discretion as applied in NLRC decisions brought to the CA under Rule 65:
"[G]rave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence." The Court further held in Banal III v. Panganiban that:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The reason for this limited review is anchored on the fact that the petition before the CA was a certiorari petition under Rule 65; thus, even the CA did not have to assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence on which the NLRC based its decision. The CA only had to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion. As the Court held in Soriano, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision.42
To recall, the case stemmed from the original complaint for illegal dismissal which Lingganay amended on July 13, 2017. In his first amended complaint, Lingganay alleged that respondents illegally terminated him from employment and claimed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.43 On August 17, 2017, Lingganay filed his position paper with motion to further amend his amended complaint,44 wherein he added as a prayer his alleged entitlement to separation pay, holiday premium, and underpaid wages.45 For being in violation of Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, the LA did not allow Lingganay to further amend his complaint. On appeal although the NLRC did not discuss the issue of whether Lingganay violated the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, in incorporating his motion to amend and his second amended complaint in his position paper, it nonetheless affirmed altogether the ruling of the LA which not only held that respondents validly dismissed Lingganay from work, but likewise denied Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint.46 In his Rule 65 and Rule 45 petitions, Lingganay justified the incorporation of his motion to amend and his second amended complaint in his position paper, citing as basis the Court's ruling in the case of Our Haus Realty Development Corporation.
The case of Our Haus Realty Development Corporation involved the complaint of Alexander Parian et al. (Parian et al.) for underpayment of wages with claims for payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay, and overtime pay, which the LA dismissed in favor of Our Haus Realty Development Corporation. Upon appeal, the NLRC partially reversed the ruling of the LA and found that Parian et al. were actually underpaid. The NLRC also ruled that the employees were entitled to their respective proportionate 13th month pay and service incentive leave (SIL) pay. Our Haus Realty Development Corporation filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. In its Rule 45 petition, Our Haus Realty Development Corporation argued, among others, that the CA erred in agreeing with the ruling of the NLRC that Parian, et al. were entitled to SIL pay, pointing out that such claim was not included in their pro forma complaint before the LA. Citing the case of Samar-Med Distribution v. NLRC,47 the Court allowed the grant of SIL to Parian et al. holding that "[a] claim not raised in the pro forma complaint may still be raised in the position paper."48
The ruling in Our Haus Realty Development Corporation was based on the Court's pronouncement in the case of Samar-Med Distribution
The case of Samar-Med Distribution, on the other hand, involved the complaint of Josafat Gutang (Gutang) for money claims against Samar Med Distribution in 1996 which was refiled in 1999. Although the complaint did not include Gutang's cause of action for illegal dismissal, the LA, in the Decision dated October 29, 1999, ruled that Gutang was illegally terminated from employment. Samar-Med Distribution questioned such finding and argued that the LA was barred to determine the validity of Gutang's dismissal because it was not included in his complaint before the LA. The case eventually reached the Court. In ruling for Gutang, the Court, in its Decision dated July 15, 2013, held as follows:
[B]ut the non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue on the dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of the dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in the complaint or position paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this, Gutang's cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper[.]49 (Emphasis supplied)
The pronouncement in Samar-Med Distribution was based on the old NLRC rules, i.e., the "1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC," not on the present procedure or the 2011 NLRC Rules
It bears noting that the Decision of the Court in Samar-Med Distribution, while promulgated on July 15, 2013, involved a complaint filed before the LA in 1999 and resolved by the LA on October 29, 1999. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court therein, with respect to the issue on the procedural aspect, was based on the old set of rules of the NLRC, i.e., the "1990 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC" (the 1990 NLRC Rules). Rule V, Section 3 thereof provides for the rules on the submission of position papers before the LA, viz.:
SECTION 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.
These verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter's direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On the basis of Rule V, Section 3 of the 1990 NLRC Rules which states in part that "[t]he parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to ... in the complaint or position papers," the Court ratiocinated in Samar-Med that the "cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper."50
On this score, it is worth mentioning that the phrase "[t]he parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to ... in the complaint or position papers" was retained in the "1999 Amendments to the NLRC Rules of Procedure" and in the subsequent "New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002" (2002 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC). However, the "2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC" (the 2005 NLRC Rules) and the 2011 NLRC Rules amended the rules on the submission of position papers and omitted the subject phrase. Significantly Rule V, Sections 12(b) and (c) of the 2011 NLRC Rules accordingly reads:
SECTION 12. SUBMISSION OF POSITION PAPER AND REPLY. – ....
(b) No amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing of position papers, unless with leave of the Labor Arbiter.
(c) The position papers of the parties shall cover only those claims and causes of action stated in the complaint or amended complaint, accompanied by all supporting documents, including the affidavits of witnesses, which shall take the place of their direct testimony, excluding those that may have been amicably settled. (Emphasis supplied)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, while amendments to a complaint are only allowed prior to the filing of position papers, such may be permitted but with leave of the LA. This means that after the filing of position papers, the LA has the discretion to determine whether an amendment of the complaint is justified under the circumstances.
Moreover, it bears noting that the 1990 NLRC Rules, and even the subsequent rules until the 2002 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, did not contain any provision on the amendment of a complaint.(awÞhi( Apparently, this is the reason why the Court, in the case of Samar-Med Distribution, allowed a claim not raised in the complaint to be still raised in the position paper, there being practically nothing which prohibited it during the old rules.
Notably, beginning the 2005 NLRC Rules until the present, the Commission has provided a specific rule on how to amend complaints. Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, already imposed a restriction as to when causes of action may still be added in the complaint; thus:
RULE V
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE LABOR ARBITERS
....
SECTION 11. AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT/PETITION. – An amended complaint or petition may be filed before the Labor Arbiter at any time before the filing of position paper, with proof of service of a copy thereof to the opposing party/ies[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, it must be emphasized that before the LA requires the parties to simultaneously submit their position papers,51 the LA first calls them to a mandatory conference. At this point, the Court likewise notes the difference between the mandatory conference under the 1990 and the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended. Rule V, Section 2 of the 1990 NLRC Rules enumerates the purposes of a "mandatory conciliation/mediation conference," viz.:
SECTION 2. Mandatory Conference/Conciliation. — Within two (2) days from receipt of an assigned case, the Labor Arbiter shall summon the parties to a conference for the purpose of amicably settling the case upon a fair compromise or determining the real parties in interest, defining and simplifying the issues in the case, entering into admissions and/or stipulations of facts, and threshing out all other preliminary matters. The notice or summons shall specify the date, time and place of the preliminary conference/pre-trial and shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint.
.... (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, beginning the 2005 procedure until the present, the Commission added a new purpose to the "mandatory conciliation and mediation conference," i.e., to determine whether there is a need to amend the complaint and for the inclusion of all causes of action in the complaint. Rule V, Section 8 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, states:
SECTION 8. MANDATORY CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION CONFERENCE. – (a) The mandatory conciliation and mediation conference shall be called for the purpose of: (1) amicably settling the case upon a fair compromise; (2) determining the real parties in interest; (3) determining the necessity of amending the complaint and including all causes of action; (4) defining and simplifying the issues in the case; (5) entering into admissions or stipulations of facts; and (6) threshing out all other preliminary matters. The Labor Arbiter shall personally preside over and take full control of the proceedings and may be assisted by the Labor Arbitration Associate in the conduct thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasis that the mandatory conference/conciliation under the 1990 procedure did not have for its purpose the following: (a) determination of the necessity to amend the complaint; and (b) inclusion of all causes of action in the complaint. These objectives having been specifically added in the 2005 and the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, the Commission indubitably intended that all matters regarding the inclusion of causes of action and the amendment of a complaint be first threshed out during the mandatory conference/conciliation before the parties are directed to simultaneously file their position papers. The intention behind this, just like any notice requirement, is to fully apprise the other party of the nature of all the causes of action in the complaint, to enable him/her to set forth intelligent and comprehensive arguments in the position paper, and to avoid surprises that may lead to injustice. They are also designed to avoid the resetting of cases just to give the other party the time to counter the new allegations and search for new evidence or witnesses to address a belatedly raised cause of action in the position paper.
At this point, it bears emphasis that while "[n]o amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing of position papers," such may be permitted but with leave of the LA. Thus, in instances where the complainants move to amend their complaint after the filing of position papers, it is within the sound discretion of the LA to determine whether the amendment is justified.
Here, it is worth mentioning that prior to the filing of his position paper, Lingganay had at least four opportunities under the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, to inform respondents of his additional claims. Lingganay could have added his claims for separation pay, holiday premium, rest day pay, and underpaid wages in the following: first, in his original Complaint for illegal dismissal; second, in his amended Complaint dated July 13, 2017, in which he added his claims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees; third, in a second amended complaint, to be filed before the filing of the position paper, pursuant to Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, which does not expressly limit the number of amendments that may be made; and fourth, in the mandatory conference/conciliation before the LA and prior to the filing of a position paper.
However, Lingganay, and even his counsel who drafted his position paper, disregarded the foregoing opportunities. Considering Lingganay's repeated failure to timely raise his additional claims at the expense of the speedy disposition of the case, it was within the sound discretion of the LA to disallow petitioner's motion to further amend his amended complaint.
To justify his non-observance of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, Lingganay's only argument before the Court is that his incorporation of his motion to further amend and his second amended complaint in his position paper was sanctioned by the Court's ruling in the case of Our Haus, which pronounced that a claim that is not raised in the pro forma complaint before the LA may still be raised in the position paper.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that at the time when Lingganay initiated the case in 2017, the procedure in effect was already the 2011 NLRC Rules. Thus, the rules that govern the filing of Lingganay's complaint, the amendments thereto, and the submission of position papers are Rule V, Sections 11 and 12(a) and (b) of the 2011 NLRC Rules which respectively state in part: "[a]n amended complaint or petition may be filed before the Labor Arbiter at any time before the filing of position paper;" "[n]o amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing of position papers, unless with leave of the Labor Arbiter;" and "[t]he position papers of the parties shall cover only those claims and causes of action stated in the complaint or amended complaint."
In this regard, the Court finds inapplicable the pronouncement in Samar-Med Distribution, as cited in Our Haus Realty Development Corporation,52 that "[a] claim not raised in the pro forma complaint may still be raised in the position paper." To be clear, such pronouncement was based on the old procedure, i.e., the 1990 NLRC Rules, which, at the time when petitioner filed his complaint for illegal dismissal, had already been superseded by the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended.
Procedural rules are not to be ignored because their infringement may have injured a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they must be observed except only for the most convincing reasons, i.e., to relieve a party of an injustice not commensurate with the extent of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. "Rules of Procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of justice. . .[R]ules may be relaxed only in 'exceptionally meritorious cases'."53
As Lingganay repeatedly disregarded the opportunities to include his additional claims, and absent any convincing justification to ignore the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, his filing of a position paper with a motion to further amend his amended complaint cannot be considered as substantial compliance with the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended. Thus, the CA aptly held that the NLRC could not have gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LA's denial of Lingganay's motion to further amend his amended complaint. After all, the labor tribunals have the foremost duty to uphold their own rules to establish order and promote the speedy disposition of cases.
The Court has time and again emphasized that procedural rules, which are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard.54 The requirement is in accordance with the Bill of Rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies."55
The issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding as valid petitioner's dismissal from work is a question of fact
The questions whether Lingganay transgressed the company rules and regulations on health and safety, i.e., "Violation 8.1.4 – Any form of laxity, reckless driving and gross negligence resulting to damages to property, injuries, death[,] and other casualties,"56 and whether he was grossly and habitually negligent in the performance of his duties would require the Court to examine anew the factual issues, which the CA and the labor tribunals already passed upon and consistently determined. Such task is not generally allowed in a Rule 45 petition. While the rule admits of exceptions, none of which are present in the case.57 Still, the Court examines the finding of the CA from the prism of whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LA's finding that Lingganay's dismissal from service was justified.58
There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.59 Such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC warrants the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari from the CA.60 As further discussed below, however, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on the NLRC that would warrant the issuance thereof.
There is substantial evidence that Lingganay was grossly and habitually negligent in the discharge of his duties as a passenger bus driver
Article 297(b) of the Labor Code provides, among others, that "[a]n employer may terminate an employment for ... [g]ross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties." Article 297(b) covers carelessness and even inefficiency of employees in the performance of their tasks. The negligence must not only be gross, i.e., "glaringly and flagrantly noticeable because of its inexcusable objectionableness," but also habitual, i.e.,"settled tendency of behavior or normal manner of procedure."61
Records show that respondents validly terminated Lingganay from employment for transgressing the company rules and regulations on health and safety and for his gross and habitual neglect of his duties under Article 297(b) of the Labor Code. On this score, the Court quotes with approval the following account of the NLRC:
[Lingganay] was guilty of violation of [DLTB Co.]'s Rules and Regulations on [Health] and Safety Rules, specifically "8.1.4 - Any form of laxity, reckless driving and gross negligence resulting to damage to property, injuries, death and other casualties."
In his own narration of facts [Lingganay] admitted that he was involved in several vehicular accidents. He said that on October 21, 2013 while driving DLTB passenger bus he met an accident involving one Isidro Alvarez. [Lingganay] did not mention whether Isidro Alvarez was his passenger, hence we deduce that he must have been a third-party pedestrian. This vehicular accident case was settled out of court. We know from experience that an out of court settlement especially one involving a physical injury claim, involves payment of financial indemnity to the injured party.
On May 15, 2015[,] [Lingganay] committed the violation of "overtaking a double yellow line" at Carmelrey intersection Brgy. Tulo, Calamba City for which he apologized to the management when asked to explain for the incident.
On October 8, 2015 he failed to "take time schedule". Hence, he was suspended for five (5) days on November 5, 2015.
On December 30, 2016[,] [Lingganay], while driving DL-550 along the National Highway, Tagkawayan, Quezon, hit the rear portion of a Mitsukoshi Hari Motorcycle causing damage to the motorcycle and slight physical injuries to its driver Aries Cepe and [the latter's] back-rider Dave Joseph Del Rosario who were taken to Tagkawayan Memorial District Hospital. [Lingganay] was detained, including the bus he was driving, at the Police Station and they were released from the Police custody only when the parties involved executed a "Kasunduan" before the Municipal Mayor whereby [Lingganay] agreed to pay the damages to the motorcycle as well as the medical expenses of the injured parties.
The last vehicular accident of [Lingganay] was on May 1, 2017[.] The evidence disclosed that [Lingganay] was driving Bus DL-551 along San Juanico Bridge following a Toyota Wigo. [Lingganay] alleged that a van overtook them and cut the path of the Toyota Wigo. The Toyota Wigo was able to stop on time and thus, avoided bumping into the rear portion of the Van. [Lingganay] however, failed to stop and bumped into the rear portion the Toyota Wigo. Investigation likewise disclosed that [Lingganay] was at fault for being [r]eckless in his manner of driving the bus. [Lingganay] right out, made an initial payment of [PHP] 5,000.00 to the owner of the Toyota Wigo. This act of [Lingganay] indicated his fault and willingness to settle the damages to the Toyota Wigo. The road where the accident occurred was "descending" or "pababa" and [complainant] did not keep safe distance from the Toyota Wigo. [Lingganay] also claimed that he was not driving fast but this is belied by the extensive damage to the Toyota Wigo indicating a strong impact by a fast moving vehicle. In fact, the owner of the Toyota Wigo claimed damages in the amount of [PHP] 99,000.00 which respondent DLTB Co. paid in exchange for the Deed of Release, Waiver[,] and Quitclaim executed by Ma. Angelica O. Talbo[,] owner of Toyota Wigo. The DLTB Co. passenger bus likewise sustained damage in the amount of [PHP] 6,500.00.62
Indubitably, the past infractions of Lingganay not only repeatedly endangered the properties, safety, or lives of his passengers, the pedestrians, and the riding public; they likewise exposed respondents to various liabilities.
Still, Lingganay insists that even if he was indeed negligent in the performance of his tasks, it was not shown that his negligence was "both gross and habitual"; that while he was previously involved in some accidents, his past mishaps were merely minor. Thus, Lingganay avers that the penalty of dismissal meted on him by respondents was too harsh.
Assuming arguendo that the employee's gross negligence was not habitual, the element of habituality may be dispensed with in instances when the recklessness caused substantial damage or loss to the employer
In LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. v. Mateo,63 the Court held that an employer cannot be legally compelled to continue the employment of a person who was guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties, thus:
Mateo was undisputedly negligent when he left the motorcycle along Burke Street in Escolta, Manila without locking it despite clear, specific instructions to do so. His argument that he stayed inside the LBC office for only three to five minutes was of no moment. On the contrary, it only proved that he did not exercise even the slightest degree of care during that very short time. Mateo deliberately did not heed the employer's very important precautionary measure to ensure the safety of company property. Regardless of the reasons advanced, the exact evil sought to be prevented by LBC (in repeatedly directing its customer associates to lock their motorcycles) occurred, resulting in a substantial loss to LBC.
Although Mateo's infraction was not habitual, we must take into account the substantial amount lost. In this case, LBC lost a motorcycle with a book value of [PHP] 46,000 which by any means could not be considered a trivial amount. Mateo was entrusted with a great responsibility to take care of and protect company property and his gross negligence should not allow him to walk away from that incident as if nothing happened and, worse, to be rewarded with backwages to boot.
An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties. This holds true specially if the employee's continued tenure is patently inimical to the employer's interest. What happened was not a simple case of oversight and could not be attributed to a simple lapse of judgment. No amount of good intent, or previous conscientious performance of duty, can assuage the damage Mateo caused LBC when he failed to exercise the requisite degree of diligence required of him under the circumstances.64
To recall, the infraction of Lingganay which prompted respondents to ultimately dismiss him from employment was his recklessness when he crashed into the rear portion of a Toyota Wigo that caused substantial damage to the car in the amount of PHP 99,000.00 and to the company bus amounting to PHP 6,500.00. To avoid any possible legal suit against the company, respondents were compelled to pay the full amount of PHP 99,000.00 to the car owner. Indubitably, even assuming that Lingganay's gross negligence was not habitual, the damage and loss caused by his last infraction to the company was so substantial that respondents indeed cannot be legally compelled to continue his employment.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error (1) in agreeing with the LA that Lingganay violated Rule V, Sections 11 and 12 of the 2011 NLRC Rules, as amended, in incorporating his motion to further amend complaint and his second amended complaint in his position paper; and (2) in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that (a) Lingganay was validly dismissed from employment for transgressing the rules and regulations of the company on health and safety, and (b) Lingganay was guilty of "[g]ross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties" under Article 297(b) of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The July 6, 2020 Decision and December 9, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155756 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 10-31.
2 Id. at 32-52. The July 6, 2020 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 155756 was penned by Associate Justice Perpetua Susana T. Atal-Paño and concurred in by Acting Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 54-56. The December 9, 2020 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 155756 was penned by Associate Justice Perpetua Susana T. Atal-Paño and concurred in by Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz of the Former First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 86-100. The December 27, 2017 Decision in NLRC LAC No. 11-003517-17 (NLRC NCR-06-09385-17) was penned by Commissioner Erlinda T. Agus and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and Commissioner Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
5 Id. at 102-104.
6 Id. at 108-118.
7 Id. at 106-107.
8 Id. at 11.
9 Id. at 108-118.
10 Id. at 12.
11 Id. at 146.
12 Id. at 34.
13 Id. at 132-135; signed by Bonapart L. Morales, Vice President for Operations, DLTB Co., Inc.
14 Id. at 135.
15 Id. at 112-113.
16 Id. at 233-234.
17 Id. at 134.
18 Id. at 222.
19 Id. at 231-238. Penned by Labor Arbiter Remedios L.P. Marcos.
20 Id. at 238.
21 Id. at 232-233.
22 Id. at 86-100.
23 Id. at 95-96.
24 Id. at 100.
25 Id. at 102-104.
26 Id. at 32-52.
27 Id. at 40.
28 Id. at 40-41.
29 Id. at 47.
30 Id. at 46-47.
31 Id. at 51.
32 Id. at 54-56.
33 740 Phil. 699, 718-719 (2014).
34 Rollo, pp. 17-18.
35 Id. at 19-20.
36 Id. at 21.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 320-336.
39 Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. v. Congress of Independent Organization-Iloilo Coca-Cola Sales Force Union, Panay Chapter, G.R. No. 240493, June 19, 2019 [Notice], citing Rules of Court, rule 45, sec. 1, which reads:...the petitioner shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
40 See Jarabelo v. Household Good Patrons, Inc., 891 Phil. 233 (2020).
41 819 Phil. 326 (2017).
42 Id. at 333-334.
43 Rollo, p. 11.
44 Id. at 108-118.
45 Id. at 115.
46 Id. at 236-238.
47 714 Phil. 16 (2013)
48 Our Haus Realty Development Corp. v. Parian.
49 Samar-Med Distribution v. National Labor Relations Commission, 714 Phil. 16, 27-28 (2013).
50 Id.
51 See 2011 NLRC Rules, Rule V, sec. 12(a).
52 740 Phil. 699, 718 (2014).
53 Mapagay v. People, 613 Phil. 91, 99 (2009).
54 Integrated Credit and Corporate Services, Co. v. Labrador, G.R. No. 233127, July 10, 2023, this pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Resolution uploaded to the Supreme Court website, citing Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COA, 845 Phil. 982, 997 (2019).
55 Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 359 Phil. 210, 220 (1998). Emphasis supplied
56 Rollo, p. 238.
57 Taggueg v. People, UDK No. 17705, January 30, 2023 [Notice].
58 See Jarabelo v. Household Goods Patrons, Inc.
59 Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, 760 Phil. 924, 932 (2015).
60 Id. at 932.
61 Citibank Savings, Inc. v. Rogan, G.R. No. 220903, March 29, 2023, citing Bawasanta v. People, 915 Phil. 577, 591-592 (2021).
62 Rollo, pp. 92-94.
63 607 Phil. 8 (2009).
64 Id. at 12-13.
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