EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 254976, August 20, 2024 ]
MARCELINO DELA CRUZ LINGGANAY, PETITIONER, VS. DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS COMPANY, INC. AND NARCISO MORALES, RESPONDENTS.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I concur in the ponencia's thorough and well-reasoned discussion of the new rule under Rule V, Section 12(a), in relation to Section 11, of the 2011 National Labor Relations Committee Rules of Procedure (NLRC Rules of Procedure), as amended,1 that after the filing of position papers, the labor arbiter determines whether an amendment of the complaint is justified, based on the case's specific circumstances. However, it bears stressing that the starting point of the labor arbiter's exercise of such discretion must be the constitutional mandate to give full protection to labor2 and to enforce labor law with social justice that "equaliz[es] the unequal."3
Hence, I respectfully dissent as to the ponencia's evaluation of whether the labor arbiter here properly disallowed petitioner Marcelino Dela Cruz Lingganay (Lingganay) to amend his complaint by concurrently filing his position paper and his motion to amend his complaint. The labor arbiter erred in failing to duly account for petitioner's lack of counsel until the stage of submitting his position paper.
This case involves Lingganay, who Del Monte Land Transport Bus Company (Del Monte) had hired as a driver. Lingganay was involved in multiple accidents,4 costing the company PHP 105,500.00 in victim compensation. He was suspended multiple times until the third incident, which led to his dismissal from employment on the grounds of reckless driving, gross negligence, and violation of company policies on health and safety.
In 2017, Lingganay filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. There is no showing that he was aided by counsel in the filing of his complaint.
Lingganay amended his complaint on July 17, 2017 to include claims for damages. He subsequently filed his Position Paper With Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint, raising monetary claims for underpayment of wages, separation pay, rest day, and holiday premium pay. However, the labor arbiter denied the motion, citing Rule V, Section 11 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended.5
In any event, the labor arbiter dismissed Lingganay's complaint, ruling that his dismissal was justified since he violated company rules on health and safety. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the labor arbiter's findings.
The Court of Appeals then affirmed the labor arbiter and the Commission's rulings. Citing Rule V, Section 12 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended,6 the Court of Appeals held that the labor arbiter correctly denied the Lingganay's amendment because the amended complaint was already embedded in the position paper before he secured leave for amendment. Thus, Lingganay filed the Petition before this Court.
With due respect to the ponencia, I maintain that there is a need to remand this case to the labor arbiter.
In Samar-Med Distribution v. National Labor Relations Commission,7 and then in Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Parian,8 the Court ruled that the non-allegation of a cause of action in a labor complaint does not preclude an employee from raising it in their position paper.
I agree that under Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, this doctrine has evolved—while a complaint may still be amended after the filing of a position paper, it must be with leave from the labor arbiter, who now has the discretion to allow or disallow it depending on the circumstances surrounding the case.
Nevertheless, the labor arbiter's exercise of such discretion must always be in keeping with the Constitution's recognition of labor as "a primary social economic force"9 that must be given full protection.10
The labor force is a "special class that is constitutionally protected" specifically "because of the inequality between capital and labor."11
In this sense, the first thing that a labor arbiter should consider in determining the justifiability of a complaint amendment is whether the worker had the assistance of counsel right from the filing of the complaint.(awÞhi(
As we stressed in Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan), Inc.,12 one of the most glaring manifestations of inequality between workers and their employers is the fact that the former, unlike the latter, seldom have the means to secure and retain representation:
[L]abor proceedings are so informally and, as much as possible, amicably conducted and without a real need for counsel, perhaps in recognition of the sad fact that a common employee does not or have extremely limited means to secure legal services nor the mettle to endure the extremely antagonizing and adversarial atmosphere of a formal legal battle. Thus, in the common scenario of an unaided worker, who does not possess the necessary knowledge to protect his rights, pitted against his employer in a labor proceeding, We cannot expect the former to be perfectly compliant at all times with every single twist and turn of legal technicality. The same, however, cannot be said for the latter, who more often than not, has the capacity to hire the services of a counsel. As an additional aid therefore, a liberal interpretation of the technical rules of procedure may be allowed if only to further bridge the gap between an employee and an employer.13 (Emphasis supplied)
This is especially true for the initiatory stage of labor proceedings; workers are usually on their own when filling up the pro forma checklist of causes of action. As we noted in Tegimenta Chemical Phils. and Garcia v. Buensalida:14
[A] complaint in a case filed before the NLRC consists only of a blank form which provides a checklist of possible causes of action that the employee may have against the employer. The check list was designed to facilitate the filing of complaints by employees and laborers even without the intervention of counsel. It allows the complainant to expediently set forth his grievance in a general manner, but is not solely determinative of the ultimate cause of action that he may have against the employer.15 (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, when the labor arbiter starts with checking if the worker had counsel, particularly at the moment of filing the complaint, their exercise of the subject discretion rightly flows from a social justice standpoint of "compassionate justice or an implementation of the policy that those who have less in life should have more in law."16 With the factor of representation being the labor arbiter's first consideration, the rest of their determination falls in line with the following principles: (1) the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed to give effect to the objectives of the Constitution and other relevant legislation;17 (2) all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor;18 and (3) the relaxation of procedural rules in labor cases is primarily for the benefit of employees.19
Applying the foregoing here, I beg to differ with the ponencia's evaluation of the labor arbiter's exercise of the subject discretion. The ponencia's evaluation is centered on the four opportunities that petitioner had to inform respondents of his additional claims. Yet there is no indication that petitioner had a counsel who would have brought those opportunities to his attention as they came up and then helped him to fully utilize them.
Crucially, the ponencia only stated that petitioner's position paper was drafted by his counsel. It is my view that the labor arbiter should have accorded more weight to petitioner's apparent lack of legal assistance prior to the preparation of his position paper. That circumstance—coupled with "the fact that initiatory complaints filed before the [National Labor Relations Commission] are just blank forms wherein the employee-complainant simply inputs his/her details, the respondent's details, and ticks off a checklist of causes of action which are applicable to him/her"20—made it all the more important for petitioner to be permitted to simultaneously submit his position paper and further amend his complaint.
Petitioner's Position Paper With Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint was his first opportunity to capitalize on a counsel's assistance and comprehensively detail all of respondents' "acts or omissions which constitute [his] causes of actions against the[m]."21 By denying petitioner's motion, the labor arbiter exercised the subject discretion in a way that preserved petitioner and respondents' imbalance (the difference between having and not having counsel guarding and advocating one's cause).
Additionally, Rule V, Section 12(d) of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, allows the filing of a Reply to respond to the allegations in a complaint and position paper.22 Respondents, having the benefit of a counsel, would have had the means to address each cause of action alleged in petitioner's position paper, even those that he missed in accomplishing the pro forma complaint checklist. Thus, petitioner's Position Paper With Urgent Motion to Amend the Complaint did not threaten respondents' due process rights. Section 12(d)—and respondents' counsel's knowledge of that provision—safeguarded respondents' "fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their ... side[] of the controversy" and submit "all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their ... claims."23
All things considered, I submit that the labor arbiter's exercise of the subject discretion ultimately ran counter to the constitutional mandate to give full protection to labor, and diverged from the social justice directive to bridge the employer-employee inequality. The labor arbiter should have granted petitioner's motion; directed respondents to file their Reply (for them to be heard on petitioner's additional causes of action, in the interest of due process); and then evaluated all of petitioner's raised claims. In that way, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended would not have "st[ood] in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties" and "the ends of substantial justice shall [have] be[en] better served."24
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition and remand the case to the labor arbiter.
Footnotes
1 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012 and NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 05-14, Series of 2014.
2 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 3 states:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all." (Emphasis supplied)
3 Paredes v. Feed the Children Phils., Inc., 769 Phil. 418, 442 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
4 In 2013, while driving a bus along Quezon Province, petitioner Lingganay was involved in an accident with one Isidro Alvarez. In 2016, he was involved in another accident, this time with a motorcycle, and received a warning from respondent Del Monte. In 2017, he crashed respondent's bus on the rear portion of a Toyota Wigo. See ponencia, pp. 2-3.
5 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule V, sec. 11, as amended, states:
Section 11. AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT/PETITION. – An amended complaint or petition may be filed before the Labor Arbiter at any time before the filing of position paper, with proof of service of a copy thereof to the opposing party/ies. If the amendment of the complaint or petition involves impleading additional respondent/s, service of another summons in accordance with Section 3 hereof is necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the said respondent/s. (See NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, Series of 2012)
6 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule V, sec. 12(b), as amended, states:
(b) No amendment of the complaint or petition shall be allowed after the filing or position papers, unless with leave of the Labor Arbiter.
7 714 Phil. 16 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
8 740 Phil. 699 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
9 CONST., art. II, sec. 18.
10 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 3 states:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. (Emphasis supplied)
11 Paredes v. Feed the Children Phils., Inc., 769 Phil. 418, 442 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]. See also Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Jaculbe v. Silliman University, 547 Phil. 352 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
12 G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022 [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].
13 Id.
14 577 Phil. 534 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division].
15 Id. at 541.
16 H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 824 Phil. 613, 631 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], citing Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 248, 306 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
17 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule I, sec. 1.
18 LABOR CODE, art. 4.
19 Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan), Inc., G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022 [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].
20 Burnea v. Security Trading Corp., 900 Phil. 194, 201 (2021) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
21 Id.
22 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule V, sec. 12(d), as amended, states that:
(d) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the position paper of the adverse party, a reply may be filed on a date agreed upon and during a schedule set before the Labor Arbiter. The reply shall not allege and/or prove facts and any cause or causes of action not referred to or included in the original or amended complaint or petition or raised in the position paper. (7a)
23 Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. v. Padilla, 744 Phil. 674, 687 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Sy v. ALC Industries, Inc., 589 Phil. 354, 361 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division] and Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 249, 265 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
24 Dela Torre v. Twinstar Professional Protective Services, Inc., 905 Phil. 275, 280 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, Third Division], citing Millenium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, 649 Phil. 199, 204 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
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